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A. KEMP FISHERIES, INC. v. CASTLE & COOK, INC., BUMBLE BEE SEAFOODS DIVISION
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 25 July 1988
852 F.2d493
Parol evidence is inadmissible to determine the terms of a charter agreement where the agreement is not ambiguous and it
is recognized by both parties as a final and complete embodiment of the terms.
FACTS: Kemp Fisheries, Inc. (Kemp), and Bumble Bee
Samoa Inc. (Bumble Bee), a fully owned subsidiary of Castle &
Cooke, Inc. agreed that Kemp would charter, with an option to
purchase, the MN City of San Diego. Kemp chartered the vessel
to fish for herring and salmon in Alaska from April to August
1983. In February, they signed a letter of intent which served as
their agreement, "pending preparation and execution of final
documentation required for the bareboat charter and option to
purchase."
Bumble Bee prepared the final bareboat charter agreement
after reviewing drafts of it with Kemp's attorney. Kemp signed
the agreement even though it did not provide for the engines to
be in good working order, nor did it represent that the freezing
system would be suitable for his needs, both of which Kemp
thought would be arranged. The final agreement contained no
such provisions, and in fact, disclaimed all warranties,express
and implied. Despite his reservations, Kemp signed the agree
ment without voicing his concerns to Bumble Bee.
During the herring season two out of three engines that pow
ered the freezing system broke down. Since Kemp could not
freeze the fish properly, he had to sell them at lower prices.
Kemp sued Bumble Bee in admiralty for breach of the charter
agreement,intentional and negligent misrepresentation,estoppel,
and rescission, claiming that Bumble Bee agreed to provide
engines in good working order and that the freezing system
would meet its specific needs.
The trial court found the charter agreement ambiguous, and
admitted parol evidence to clarify the parties' intent. Bumble
Bee was held liable because of the vessel's inablity to freeze
herring and salmon resulting from Bumble Bee's breach of
warranties.
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in admitting parol evidence to
determine the terms of the charter agreement when all three
parties had the opportunity to review and revise the agreement
before signing it?

ANALYSIS: In its reversal, the Ninth Circuit rendered judg
ment for Bumble Bee because the charter agreement was an
integrated contract. It was complete and comprehensive, and
the letter of intent was a recognition by the parties that the
charter would be the final documentation of their agreement. If
a contract is integrated, "Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to
add to, detract from, or vary the terms of a written contract,"
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & R. Co.,
69 Cal.2d 33,69 Cal. Rptr. 561,565,442 P.2d 641,645 ( 1968).
"The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the
meaning of a written instrument is ... whether the offered evi
dence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of
the instrument is reasonably susceptible. Trident Center v. Con·
necticut General Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564,570 (9th Cir. 1988).
The charter agreement here, was not "reasonably susceptible "
to the district court's interpretation that it warrants the sea
worthiness of the vessel, the condition of the engines, and the
capacity of the freezing system.
Sub-paragraph 3B related to the condition of the ve.sse! prior
to delivery. It guaranteed neither the accuracy of the survey nor
the seaworthiness of the vessel. Sub-paragraphs 3E and F make
it clear that Kemp's acceptance of delivery released Bumble Bee
from responsibility for the vessel's condition and cannot be
interpreted reasonably to warrant seaworthiness. Nor should
the court have admitted evidence that Bumble Bee warranted
the condition of the engines and the capacity of the freezing
system because sub-paragraphs 3B, E,and F do not even mention
them,and are not "reasonably susceptible" to that interpretation.
The Court of Appeals emphasized that sub-paragraph 3E
stated that after accepting delivery, "Kemp shall not be entitled
to make or assert any claim against the owner on account of any
representation or warranties,express or implied,regarding the
vessel". Sub-paragraph 3F provided that Kemp's acceptance of
the vessel was conclusive evidence that it inspected the vessel
and "deemed" it seaworthy and suitable for its needs. The court
(Continued ...)

Kemp v. Bumble Bee (Cont.)
concluded that these clauses clearly and unequivocally com
municated that the risk of unseaworthiness would fall on Kemp
once it accepted the vessel. Bumble Bee effectively waived all
warranties.
In addition, the Court of Appeals noted that Kemp and Bumble
Bee are corporations familiar with business transactions.
Kemp's attorney received the charter with Bumble Bee in the
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month before signing, and changes were incorporated into the
final charter. These factors persuaded the court to hold that
"nothing suggested that the agreement was not recognized by
both parties as final and complete."
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment;
Bumble Bee is not liable for Kemp's losses.
Laura Dilimetin '90

MAJORIE LYKES AND LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 30 June 1988
85 1 F.2d 78
To determine the "customary freight unit" within the meaning of limitation of liability with respect to the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, the courts should examine the bill of lading and the filed tariff which expresses the contractual
relationships of the parties.
COGSA (46 U.S.C. App. § 1304 (5)), the court should examine
prior negotiations as well as the bill of lading and filed tariff?

FACTS: In October 1982, the FMC Corporation <FMCl shipped
30 small fire engines from Pennsylvania to Egypt on the SS
Majorie Lykes under an agreement with the Lykes Brothers
Steamship Company <Lykes). The carrier charged the shipper
on a lump sum basis, and a description of the goods recited on
the bill of lading was "30 Unboxed-Fire Engines". The same bill
reflected a lump sum charge of "$4250/ea. x 30". There was no
mention of value of the goods within the bill of lading. As the fire
engines were being unloaded, Lykes dropped one engine onto
two others destroying all three. FMC replaced the three fire
engines at a total cbst of $ 165,254 and commenced an action in
the district court seeking damages under the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act <COGSAl.
After a bench trial, the district court found Lykes liable for
the damage, recognizing that in the absence of declaration of
value of goods in the bill of lading, COGSA limits the carriers
liability to $500 per customary freight unit.
The district court, seeking to determine what unit the parties
actually used to compute the freight charged for the shipment,
looked first to the bill of lading and the filed tariff. Both documents
recited a lump sum rate, $4250 for each of the 30 fire engines.
However, in attempting to discern the intent of the parties, the
district court looked beyond these two documents and also con
sidered the parties negotiations.
Prior to arriving at the agreed lump sum shipping rate, the
parties had negotiated for a rate based on a weight/measurement
unit of 40 cubic feet. They assumed that each fire engine
measured 1700 cubic feet, although as it turned out later, the
actual measurement was 1522.5 cubic feet. Lykes initially of
fered to ship the freight at $165 for each 40 cubic foot unit and
later reduced its offer to $ 125 per unit. Before measuring the fire
engines to determine the actual number of cubic feet involved,
the parties agreed to a lump sum rate of $4250 per fire engine.
FMC contended that this lump sum figure was arrived at by
multiplying a rate of $100 per weight/measurement unit by
42.5, the number of 40 cubic foot units in an assumed 1700 cubic
feet fire engine. Based on the negotiations, the district court
concluded that the customary freight for this shipment was 40
cubic feet, that there were 127.5 units in the three damaged fire
engines, and thus at $500 per unit, that Lykes was liable for
$63,750.

ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re
versed the district courts decision because the bill of lading and
the filed tariff were conclusive on the question of the customary
freight unit for this shipment and entered a judgment of $1500
for the plaintiff.
The limitation of liability provision of COGSA, 46 U.S.C. App.
§1304 (5) provides that "neither the carrier nor the ship shall in
any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in
connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceed
ing $500 per package lawful money of the United States, or in
the case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight
unit, ... "
FMC could have eliminated the limitation of liability by
declaring a higher value of the goods in the bill of lading. In this
case, no value at all was declared in the bill. Since the fire
engines were not shipped in packages, the carriers liability is
limited to the $500 per "customary freight unit." The question
presented, therefore is, what is the "customary freight unit?"
The cases discussing the meaning of "customary freight unit"
are inconsistent. While some courts have held that the customary
freight unit is the measurement "customarily" used to calculate
the rate to be charged, the Second Circuit has taken a different
approach. In the Second Circuit the customary freight unit is
the actual freight unit used by the parties to calculate freight for
the shipment at issue. Binladen BSB Landscaping v. M. V. Ned
lloyd Rotterdam, 759 F.2d 1006, 1016 <2d Cir.l cert. denied, 474
U.S. 902, 106 S.Ct. 229 88 L.Ed 220 < 1985!.
In this case the description of the goods recited on the bill of
lading and filed tariff was clear. Where there is no ambiguity in
either the bill of lading or the tariff, there is no need for the
district court to consider any of the parties earlier negotiations,
and in doing so, the district court erred.
Thus, the intent of the parties as to the customary freight unit
is the Second Circuit standard, and in determining that intent
the courts must look to the bill of lading and the tariff. Absent
any ambiguity there, the inquiry is ended, and both parties are
bound to the freight unit therein adopted. This rule provides
certainty and fairness to both sides. The intended freight unit is
set forth in the bill of lading, and before shipment either party
could require that a different unit be expressed.
Glenn T. Henneberger '91

ISSUE: Whether in determining a "customary freight unit"
within the meaning of the limitation of liability provision of
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